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Strengthening civil society constitutes an increas-
ingly important element in the array of positive aid
measures adopted by aid donors as part of the good
government agenda. Although donors have long
supported civic associations, often through non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), the volume of
aid allocated for this purpose has generally been
small and it has been peripheral to the main aid
policy agenda. The article begins by exploring the
rationale behind this shift in emphasis, highlight-
ing the interplay of domestic and international
factors. It then surveys the range of meanings attrib-
uted to the concept in academic debate and the role
of civil society in the process of democratic consoli-
dation. The nature of the relationship between civil
society and the state in Africa provides a basis for
assessing the role of foreign aid and its potential
impact on the internal dynamics of civicassociations
and their capacity to contribute to political pluralism
and democratic consolidation. The conclusion con-
siders the benefits and limitations of this type of aid
in strengthening civil society and the types of inter-
ventions and funding mechanisms that hold most
promise in this regard.
1 THE RESURGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
The 1990s have seen a major upsurge of interest in
the concept of civil society and its relevance to
understanding democratic transition and consoli-
dation in the developing world. Although the civic
realm was acknowledged to be an important locus
of organizational activity, few commentators gave
the concept serious attention in view of a general
pre-occupation with the role of the state and au-
thoritarian forms of government which prevailed in
most developing countries. A number of factors
help to explain a marked revival of interest in a
concept that had received limited attention in schol-
arly and aid policy circles, especially in Africa.1
The experience of democratization in most regions
of the developing world from the early 1980s was a
major factor in shifting academic concerns from the
Important exceptions were Bayart (1986) and various essays in
Rothchild and Chazan (1988)
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state to societal institutions. It brought with it an
interest in the capacity of civic organizations and
new social movements to play an active role in
undermining authoritarian rule and contributing to
the process of democratic consolidation. This was
especially important in Eastern Europe where the
all-pervasive state had circumscribed an autono-
mous sphere of associational life, but in which civil
society provided the well-spring for the successful
democracy movements of the late 1980s, and a source
of inspiration for democracy movements elsewhere
in the developing world.
A second explanation stems from economic factors
which have political implications. Sustained econo-
mic decline and mismanagement in much of Africa
in the 1980s under the aegis of statist regimes was
often accompanied by disengagement from the for-
mal economy, marked by the withdrawal of the
peasantry from the market back into subsistence
production, outward migration and the spread of
the parallel economy characterized by hoarding,
currency exchange, smuggling and other illegal
activities. This process of disengagement further
undermined the legitimacy of the state and weak-
ened its links with societal institutions (Chazan
1988). In some contexts, such as Zambia, Côte
D'Ivoire and Benin, the weakening of the state's
legitimacy and its control over society gave succour
to pro-democracy movements, whereas in countries
such as Liberia and Somalia it gave rise to destruc-
tive tendencies promoted by ethnic and regional
interests competing for political power (Bratton
and van de Walle 1992).
Third, the trend towards privatization and the roll-
ing back of the state as an integral element of donor
aid policy has focused attention on the scope for
the provision of public services through private
sector organizations. In Africa, this has invariably
centred on the capacity of the voluntary sector and
local self-help organizations to contribute towards
health and educational provision given the uneven-
ness of formal sector provision, which has further
shifted the balance of power and social respon-
sibility away from the state in favour of societal
institutions. This is reinforced by expectations on
the part of aid donors that NGOs in particular will
play an increasingly significant role in service
delivery and poverty alleviation programmes.
Fourth, problems encountered in the application
of political conditionality as a means of fostering
political reform and good government have focused
donor attention on the potential for promoting these
objectives through positive aid measures (Moore
and Robinson 1994). These have included channel-
ling aid to civic associations and organized interest
groups with a view to enhancing democratic con-
solidation and political participation. The success
of such initiatives in Chile and South Africa has
increased donors' confidence in their potential else-
where. Recipients of such assistance typically
include NGOs, business and professional associa-
tions (principally lawyers and journalists), trade
unions, womens' organizations, and human rights
groups. All of these are deemed as constituting
key organizations in civil society, but there is little
agreement about what is conveyed by the term or
the objectives of directing aid to such organizations.
2 CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC
CONSOLIDATION
There are many competing interpretations of civil
society, which have their origins in various currents
of western political philosophy.2 In the liberal tra-
dition, civil society is defined as a public realm
located between the family and the state, consisting
of a plurality of civil associations. The formation of
such associations by citizens of their own volition
can counteract the potential abuse of power and
wealth. They also function to nurture civil and
political rights, to advocate popular demands and to
promote democratic values. These ideas were chal-
lenged by theorists such as Hegel and Marx who
espoused an historicist approach, in which civil
society is seen as the product of a long process of
historical transformation governed by the emergence
of a sphere of market relations under capitalism.
This notion was developed further by Antonio
Gramsci, who treated civil society as an inherently
conflictual arena, where civic institutions reproduce
and disseminate the hegemonic ideas and values
1 For a comprehensive review see Keane (1988) and Bobbio
(1988).
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associated with capitalism, but which are subject to
contestation.
Clearly these two traditions are associated with
very different interpretations of civil society, which
have significant operational implications, since
most aid donors are inclined towards the liberal
interpretation. However, some writers have dis-
cerned a degree of convergence between the two
traditions centring on the claim that civil society is
a distinct public realm located between the family
and the state, where individuals join together to
pursue collective goals (Bratton 1994: 55-6). Civil
society therefore includes a wide array of organiza-
tions which have a range of objectives stemming
from the shared interests of their members. Accord-
ing to Stepan (1988), it is distinct from political
society, which includes political parties, legisla-
tures and elections, through which organized inter-
ests enter into coalitions and compete for political
power.
Diamond (1994) has classified civil society organi-
zations into seven categories depending on their
goals and membership: (1) economic (productive
and commercial associations and networks); (2)
cultural (religious, communal and ethnic associa-
tions); (3) informational and educational (organiza-
tions dedicated to the production and circulation of
ideas and information); (4) interest-based (designed
to advance the interests of workers, professionals,
etc.); (5) developmental (NGOs and self-help
groups); (6) issue-oriented (movements for environ-
mental protection, womens' rights, etc.) and (7) civic
(aimed at strengthening the political system and im-
parting democratic values). According to Diamond
civil society also encompasses the mass media and
other institutions which contribute to the flow of
information and ideas (such as universities, pub-
lishing houses, etc.) but which do not represent
associations formed by organized interests. Such a
typology resonates with the pluralist approach
favoured by most aid donors who conceive civil
society as an aggregation of organized interests
pursuing a benign and rational political agenda.
For example, according to the UNDP:
Civil society is the sphere in which social move-
ments become organized. The organizations of
civil society, which represent many diverse and
sometimes contradictory social interests are
shaped to fit their social base, constituency, the-
matic orientations (e.g. environment, gender,
human rights) and types of activity. They
include church related groups, trade unions,
cooperatives, service organizations, community
groups and youth organizations, as well as
academic institutions and others
(Riddell arid Bebbington 1995: 23).
For many commentators, the concept only attains
practical significance when considered in relation to
the state, and more specifically, the process of demo-
cratization. As indicated in the previous section,
civil society emerged into popular discourse in the
late 1980s by virtue of the prominent role played
by civic associations in democratic transitions in
Latin America and Eastern Europe, especially by
those representing the working class, professionals,
students and new social movements which, in many
instances, joined forces into a 'popular upsurge'
against incumbent authoritarian regimes (O'Donnell
and Schmitter 1986). The pivotal role played by
mass protest in political transition in Africa has
also received attention. According to Bratton (1994),
three broad, primarily urban-based, groups have
been important in the African context: the popular
classes of self-employed peasants, artisans and
vendors; the unionized working class; and the mid-
dle classes consisting of entrepreneurs, administra-
tors and professionals. Prompted by a combination
of economic malaise and political atrophy, these
strata joined forces to challenge the authority and
legitimacy of authoritarian regimes across the con-
tinent, in many cases giving rise to a process of
democratic transition. This process was generally
short-lived, culminating in multi-party elections or
in the installation of a caretaker government to
negotiate the form of a successor regime. At this
point, the institutions of political society assumed a
more prominent role in completing the transition
from authoritarian rule, centred on political parties
competing for power through elections. Having
achieved their po'itical objective, civic organiza-
tions, especially those representing professionals
and the middle class, assumed a more neutral role,
taking on responsibility for voter registration,
election monitoring and human rights work.
Now that this phase is largely complete, interest is
increasingly focusing on the role played by civil
society in democratic consolidation, defined as the
process whereby democracy attains widespread
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acceptance as the preferred system for the conduct
of political affairs, since this has yet to be achieved
in most African countries which have undergone a
political transition. According to Diamond (1994: 7):
Civil society is ... a vital instrument for contain-
ing the power of democratic governments,
checking their potential abuses and violations of
the law, and subjecting them to public scrutiny.
Indeed, a vibrant civil society is probably more
essential for consolidating and maintaining
democracy than for initiating it.
This type of approach finds resonance among bi-
lateral aid agencies. According a recent paper pub-
lished by the Development Assistance Committee
of the OECD (1994: 11).
[B]asic to democratization is the development of
a pluralist civil society comprised of a range of
institutions and associations which represent
diverse interests and provide a counterweight to
government. Interaction between the formal
political regime and civil society contributes to,
and also requires, a responsive government,
which is one of the characteristics of a function-
ing democracy. Supporting pluralism, e.g. the
development of autonomous civil associations,
professional and interest organizations, is an
important step in fostering democratization.
White (1994) argues that the growth of civil society
can contribute to democratic governance in four
complementary ways: by altering the balance of
power between state and society to achieve a bal-
anced opposition in favour of the latter; enforcing
standards of public morality and performance and
improving the accountability of politicians and state
officials; transmitting the demands and articulating
the interests of organized groups, in the process
providing an alternative sphere of representation;
and instilling and upholding democratic values.
However, as White points out, while civil society
holds real potential to influence the process of
democratic consolidation, its role and significance
in any given context is contingent on the specific
character and power of the state and the interna-
tional political environment.
Civil society organizations in Africa vary consider-
ably in their capacity to contribute to democratic
consolidation and, in any case, many of these are
neither equipped nor inclined to perform the
various roles outlined by White. Indeed, the task of
improving the political system and making it
more democratic is assigned by Diamond (1994) to
a special category of 'civic' organizations, although
a range of organizations might be expected to con-
tribute to this process, including womens' groups,
business associations and peasant organizations.
At the same time it is important to recognize that
not all organized interests will share a common
view about the desirability of democratic forms of
politics; indeed, the experience of post-colonial
rule in Africa suggests that in some circumstances
social élites might perceive the reinstallation of a
democratic regime as an opportunity to gain spe-
cial favours from corrupt politicians. Other sections
of civil society are likely to feel threatened by the
prospect of a civilian regime which commands
authority and widespread popular support, espe-
cially those engaged in illegal or harmful activities
such as smuggling and gun-running. Moreover, there
are many groups in African society who have no
interest in politics or lack the time and resources to
enable them to play an effective role in consensus-
building. On the other hand, grassroots activity
might act as a constraint on democracy by separat-
ing people from meaningful political participation
at the national level. Finally, while the growth
of associational activity and the proliferation of
voluntary organizations can reinforce societal
institutions they may undermine state capacity
(Chazan 1992). Despite these qualifications, there
may exist a particular set of conditions in which a
wide range of civil society organizations can take on
constitutive and disciplinary roles which are sup-
portive of the process of democratic consolidation.
Bratton (1994) has identified three such conditions -
material, organizational and ideological - which
support the emergence of active civil societies in
the context of political transition by giving them a
base which is independent from that of the state. In
the classical Marxist tradition, material conditions
are a function of the ability of groups and individu-
als to accumulate capital and hence are contingent
on the growth of an indigenous bourgeoisie. The
political affiliations of this class are substantially
affected by economic performance and the ability of
the government to create the conditions in which
independent enterprises can prosper. Moreover,
the existence of a middle class is often held to be key
to the consolidation of a functioning democracy.
The organizational realm refers to intermediate as-
sociations in civil society and the organizational
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linkages between them; this would typically include
churches, trade union federations and business a
ssociations. The scope for these networks to emerge
and establish an independent base is usually contin-
gent on political and historical circumstances; clearly,
the ending of authoritarian rule provides them with
political space to flourish and develop. Finally, the
ideological dimension is a function of the level of
discourse which mobilizes critical debate. In Africa,
this invariably centres on problems of economic
mismanagement and élite corruption, although the
rallying cry might take the form of moral con-
demnation as opposed to popular mobilization
depending on the organization which assumes the
lead role in the process of political transition. But
it can also take the form of irredentism and funda-
mentalist movements which have little interest in
democracy, as the case of Algeria demonstrates,
which should serve as a reminder of the contradic-
tory roles played by civil society organizations in
this regard.
While these three factors are important, access to
resources is a critical determinant of the ability of
civic organizations to make an effective contribu-
tion to democratic consolidation. These take the
form of financial as well as organizational and ideo-
logical resources. The resources available to civic
organizations emerging from a protracted period
of authoritarian rule are usually fairly meagre on
account of suppression and limited access to out-
side information. Many organizations are formed
during the process of political liberalization and do
not have strong social foundations. These will have
considerable experience of challenging authori-
tarian regimes but little knowledge of building
democratic government since mobilizing public
opinion against authoritarian rule is far easier than
active promotion of democratic values and political
participation. The absence of a strong organiza-
tional base can limit the legitimacy they possess
and the skills base on which they are able to draw.
At the same time, while insufficient financial re-
sources and limited technical expertise have posed
problems for civil society organizations, the mobili-
zation of funds through membership contributions
has proved possible, especially for local credit un-
ions and development groups, but also for trade
unions and professional associations, and can en-
hance their legitimacy and accountability. In this
respect Chazan (1992: 290) notes that 'associational
autonomy is more central to the vitality of civil
societies than the availability of adequate means'.
Nevertheless, in situations where the ability to
mobilize domestic financial resources is highly cir-
cumscribed, outside support can play a vital role in
strengthening the capacity of civic organizations to
build and sustain democracy in the fragile condi-
tions that many contemporary African societies are
facing. External support derives principally from
official aid donors, but historically assistance from
political foundations, non-governmental organiza-
tions, international federations representing busi-
ness and the professions (for example through the
Rotarians and the Lions Clubs), trade unions, and
churches has made a significant contribution. Al-
though aid designed to strengthen civil society can
be interpreted very broadly, the principal focus
of donor efforts in the context of democratic consoli-
dation have been on urban-based organizations in
six main categories: business and professional
bodies, trade unions, womens' organizations,
human rights groups, religious organizations and
advocacy-based NGOs.3
3 THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID DONORS
For reasons outlined earlier, strengthening civil
society has become a major objective of aid donors
in the 1990s, but there are historical precedents. The
US government, for example, has funded civic
organizations in developing countries in the past,
but not always with the intention of deepening
democracy. A prominent objective of American
political aid in the 1950s and 1960s was to counter
Communist influence in the international trade un-
ion movement. Much of this was provided by
USAID and channelled through four regional
labour institutes of the International Department of
the American Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) created in the
1960s. US democracy assistance programmes were
formalized and expanded in the early 1980s and a
variety of organizations assumed responsibility
for publicly funded foreign political aid (see
Carothers in this volume). The funds allocated for
this purpose have increased rapidly, from US$93
million in 1990 to some $400 million in 1994.
NGOs represent only one category within the panoply of
organizations supported by donors for furthering democratic
goals, and it is primarily advocacy-based organizations rather
than development NGO5 engaged in service delivery which per-
form this role. It is also doubtful whether NGO5 actually form
part of civil society, since they are generally function as inter-
mediaries between donors and civil society organizations, as
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Germany has also long been involved in democracy
promotion centring on support for political parties,
trade unions and civil society organizations. The
German Stiftungen (political foundations) aligned
to the three major political parties, were originally
founded for internal political education after
World War II, but became active in international
political projects in the 1950s. After the creation of
the German ministry for overseas development in
1961, the government channelled funds to the foun-
dations for 'socio-political education' in developing
countries. The bulk of the funds are in the form of
grants to party-based organizations, but projects to
promote trade unions, cooperatives and other civil
society organizations are also important. In 1989,
funding from the German development ministry
to the political foundations amounted to $156
million; a further $183 million was provided to
German non-governmental organizations for de-
velopment work (Pinto-Duschinsky 1991).
The British government has since adopted a similar
model, but on a much smaller scale, in the form of
the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, which
was established in 1992. Its objectives are to build
democratic institutions overseas through support
for political parties, human rights groups, trade
unions, journalists' and lawyers' organizations,
womens' groups, and other civil society organiza-
tions. Half the budget is allocated to British political
parties to support counterparts in other countries,
while the remainder is for all-party or no-party
pro-jects. In 1992/93 the Fourtdationprovided grartts
totalling US$1,400,000 for 140 projects in three
priority regions: Central and Eastern Europe, the
former Soviet Union, and Anglophone Africa.
Other bilateral aid donors and private foundations
have supported similar activities in the past, but not
on such a large scale as the American and German
governments, and through a variety of institutional
mechanisms.4 Most support trade union develop.
ment, either through domestic trade union federa-
tions or through multilateral bodies like the ILO
and the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU). In 1991 support from bilateral
agencies for trade union development amounted
conduits of resources and information. See Frantz (1987) and
Fowler (1991).
The Ford Foundation has played a very important role in this
regard, having provided grants to a range of civil society
organizations in developing countries over a number of years.
to US$69 million (out of US$92 million from all
sources); almost half of this went to trade unions in
Africa, for a variety of projects spanning education,
health and safety, and capacity building (ICFTU
1993). The Danish government is among the larger
donors in this area, allocating US$5 million annually
to the Danish Trade Union Council for International
Development Co-operation. USAID has assisted in
the growth and development of business associa-
tions in several African countries as part of an
initiative to increase the profile of the private sector.
Canada and the Netherlands have given positive
support to human rights organizations over a number
of years, usually with NGOs serving as intermediar-
ies. Another important area of donor intervention is
the promotion of womens' rights, especially in the
form of legal awareness programmes, but also
through more general capacity building and train-
ing programmes for womens' organizations.
A large proportion of donor funding for civil society
DrganizatiOns is channelled through NGOs, although
it is difficult to distinguish projects designed to
strengthen institutional capacity and promote
democracy from those which have more narrowly
focused development objectives. Examples of the
former are the special budget lines created by the
European Commission which are open to NGOs: in
1992 US$8 million was allocated for human rights
and democracy initiatives, and a further US$8 mil-
lion for supporting democratization in Chile and
Central America, primarily through Latin Ameri-
can and European NGOs.5 Special funds such as
these are less common among the bilateral donors
(the Dutch government is an exception in this regard
since it has special programmes for human rights,
trade unions and the media), although a number of
NGO projects funded through conventional co-
financing mechanisms have similar objectives. For
example, most human rights work supported by
CIDA has been undertaken by NGOs, and funds for
this have amounted to over US$100 million over the
past decade (Riddell and Bebbington 1995: 54).
Some donors concentrate their efforts on fostering
a political and legislative environment which is
conducive to the work of civil society organizations,
by ensuring that freedoms of expression and asso-
ciation are enshrined in law, and pressing for changes
in the legislative framework which govern their
activities. A number support civic organizations
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for discrete democracy-building purposes, in the
form of election-monitoring, fostering accountability
and transparency in government, and strengthening
democratic political institutions. Another approach
has been to increase the capacity of organized inter-
est groups to assume a more prominent role in
policy dialogue and implementation, by improving
their research and advocacy skills, strengthening
their organizational base and providing them with
equipment and office space. In some cases, increas-
ing the involvement of civic organizations in policy
dialogue is designed to broaden the consensus
behind a particular development strategy, which in
much of Africa centres on economic liberalization
and an enhanced role for the private sector.
4 THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN POLITICAL AID
Although many donors are rapidly increasing the
volume of foreign political aid, the overall objectives
of projects designed to strengthen civil society or-
ganizations are not always clearly stated. For most
donors, assisting the growth and development of
such organizations is intrinsically a good thing,
since it contributes to political pluralism and draws
more people into associational life. The expectation
is that a vibrant civil society can facilitate political
participation and inculcate democratic values by
involving marginalized groups and providing them
with access to those holding positions of power,
although in Africa this potential is generally latent
rather than proven (Chazan 1992). Landell-Mills
(1992: 552) identifies four ways in which civil
society might be nurtured: (1) by facilitating the
dissemination of information; (2) by strengthening
the rule of law; (3) by expanding education and the
capacity for self-expression and (4) by generating
surplus resources to support associational activities
without compromising their autonomy. Donor as-
sistance efforts have ranged across all four areas,
but in practice most support comes in the form of
financial resources and technical assistance.
However, since the overall objectives of foreign
political aid are often vague and ill-defined, it is
difficult to assess the impact of interventions de-
signed to strengthen civil society with any degree of
precision. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate
what the probable effects might be in order to high-
light problems that might arise if donors persist
with a strategy premised on the pluralist notion
In 1992 a new budget line of US$0.8 million was established to organizations, but this is small in comparison with other budget
support local authorities, trade unions and grassroots lines open to NGOs.
that civil society organizations are working towards
a common goal of strengthening democracy with-
out a conflict of interests. This would enable one to
identify the most appropriate mechanisms for such
assistance and to avoid interventions which might
be counter-productive from the point of view of
democratic consolidation or damaging in other
respects.
The four categories outlined by White (1994) pro-
vide a framework through which these questions
can be addressed. The first centres on altering the
balance of power between the state and society in
favour of the latter through the creation of a dense
network of civil society organizations. The avail-
ability of foreign aid can provide a powerful
stimulus for new organizations to be formed, and
can assist in increasing the size and membership of
existing organizations. Whether this type of exter-
nal assistance can contribute to democratic con-
solidation by increasing the scope for political
participation is a function of the types of groups
receiving external assistance, the nature of their
membership and degree of popular legitimacy. Sim-
ply encouraging the formation of new groups and
organizations may generate little visible return un-
less the assistance is directed towards organizations
which have clear objectives and real potential to
advance the democracy agenda. In this respect
Chazan (1992: 303) cautions that 'while the volun-
tary sector has helped to undermine statism and to
provide a political opening for specific interests
and norms, it has yet to establish institutional foun-
dations and normative principles essential to the
consolidation of civil society and hence democracy.'
The dangers inherent in indiscriminate funding
of civil society organizations to promote political
pluralism are in some ways rather obvious. Differ-
ent donors may encourage the formation of organi-
zations which are seeking to root themselves in a
similar constituency, or support organizations
which have conflicting objectives (for example busi-
ness associations versus trade unions). There is also
a danger that the availability of external aid might
attract unscrupulous organizations possessing
agendas which are antithetical to democracy, ei-
ther because their leaders are intent on using the
organization as a means of furthering personal
political objectives, or because the organization in
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question has goals which serve to undermine
political consensus and generate social conflict.
These problems can be mitigated or avoided if
donors are willing to coordinate their actions, possi-
bly by focusing their assistance programmes on
organizations with which they have a particular
affinity or for which relevant expertise is available
within their own country. They also focus attention
on the importance of rigorous appraisal and in-
formed local knowledge in preference to the rather
ad hoc procedures utilized by most donors in whic1
aid or diplomatic staff try to spot eligible organiza-
tions or filter unsolicited requests in a more reactive
mode. This underlines the need for building capac-
ity in donor organizations which may not possess
the staff resources or operational structure to enable
them to adopt such procedures.6
The second category concerns the disciplinary
function performed by civil society organizations
to ensure that the state is operating along demo-
cratic principles. This takes several forms: the intro-
duction and enforcement of mechanisms for holding
politicians or public officials accountable for their
actions; the protection and extension of civil and
political rights; and monitoring state behaviour in
relation to human rights. These functions can only
be performed by a fairly narrow range of civic
organizations with specialist skills, such as lawyers'
and journalists' associations, and civil rights
groups. The main problem here might be that of too
much money being made available to relatively few
capable organizations, which could encourage the
formation of rival associations, or detract existing
organizations from their primary objectives. Heavy
reliance on donor funding might also undermine
their wider legitimacy and inhibit their susta inability.
Landell-Mills (1992: 554) notes in this regard:
External funding should always take the form of
supplementary assistance and ought never to be
the main source of what is needed. Members are
easy to attract when given access to free resources,
but if outside grants become absolutely indispen-
sable, then the sustainability of organization or
institution becomes highly questionable.
Another problem relates to the limited political
agendas of these organizations, especially those
6 Riddell and Bebbington (1995: 53) make a similar point in the effective support 'requires local knowledge and an in-country
context of donor funding for southern NGO5, in arguing that presence over an extended period'.
representing lawyers, which might ultimately be
more interested in pursuing the narrow self-
interests of their members from the point of view
of widening opportunities for monetary gain and
enhanced status than democratic goals per se.
Moreover, as Chazan has observed, some of the
urban-based middle-class groups which assumed
a prominent role in movements campaigning for
the restoration of democratic rule were active in
supporting authoritarian rule in the past (Chazan
1992: 303). These problems point to the need to
establish channels for facilitating dialogue between
donors and potential recipients to identify joint
priorities and to enable donors to respond to re-
quests for assistance in line with these priorities
rather than with donor-driven policy objectives
requiring quick and demonstrable results which
could result in inappropriate funding decisions.
The third category of intervention lies in the inter-
mediary role performed by civic organizations be-
tween the state and society by transmitting and
articulating interest group demands. In this capac-
ity civil society organizations seek to promote
greater consultation and popular involvement in
the process of policy formulation, especially by
disadvantaged groups which have traditionally
been denied access to political power. It also em-
braces more activist forms of engagement with the
state, where civic organizations employ a variety of
means to provide their constituents with greater
'voice' in order to influence state officials and policy
decisions. These can range from advocacy efforts
centred on the media and political lobbying through
to more confrontational approaches involving
demonstrations and other forms of non-violent
protest.
Donors have placed particular emphasis on im-
proving the scope for participation by marginalized
social groups in the public policy process. At the
level of development projects this takes the form
of popular participation in decision making and
policy implementation and NGOs are seen to play
an important role in this regard. This concern
extends to policy dialogue on the national plane and
donors have sought to enhance the capacity of or-
ganized interest groups for research and policy
analysis to enable them to make more effective
interventions in the policy process. Democratiza-
tion presents new opportunities for interest groups
to gain access to state policy makers and public
officials, in order to present their particular view-
point on policy decisions which are likely to affect
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their members. Donor assistance in the form of
training, technical assistance and equipment is com-
plemented by helping governments set up forums
through which formal policy dialogue can take
place.
One problem with these types of interventions is
that relatively small amounts of foreign funding
can have a considerable impact on organizational
capacity, and create an imbalance in the power and
resources available to different organizations. For
example, the proclivity of the United States to sup-
port business associations is in line with its policy
stance of promoting free enterprise and a higher
level of support to such organizations can give them
privileged access to policy makers and heightened
visibility in public policy arenas. This can give rise
to special pleading on the part of sectional busi-
ness interests in favour of policies which are of
immediate short-term benefit to their members but
potentially harmful to others.
Second, strengthening the capacity of private
sector lobby groups and other influential civic
organizations for policy dialogue often carries with
it an implicit ideological agenda. Efforts to involve
more organized interests in the policy process are
frequently directed towards creating a more active
consensus in favour of economic reform, by giving
the potential beneficiaries of reform a greater stake
in policy outcomes, but also by mitigating potential
opposition from the losers of reform, or at least
channelling active opposition into passive accept-
ance. This is obviously desirable from the point of
view of the proponents and funders of structural
adjustment programmes since it increases the
likelihood of political sustainability, but it might
squeeze out room for alternative perspectives and
feedback on the adverse impact of economic reform
unless provision is made for this. It might also
conflict with the ambitions of other donors to pro-
mote a redistributive agenda centred on increasing
the access of the poor and politically disenfran-
chised groups to the policy process. Hence, groups
which resist or criticize the policy agenda of the
government might find themselves marginalized or
deliberately sidelined as a result of a desire among
donors to strengthen supporters of the prevailing
agenda.
A third problem is the possibility of overloading
the capacity of government policy-makers to accom-
modate interest group pressure without damaging
the technical consistency of policy initiatives. Many
policy makers in adjusting economies in Africa are
already under serious pressure of work and those
concerned with economic policy spend a consider-
able amount of time attending to donor require-
ments and policy conditions; they are often not in
a position to respond sympathetically even if they
are well disposed to increased policy dialogue. A
more serious prospect is that of gridlock where
sustained interest group pressure fosters inertia
and undermines the capacity of the government to
pursue a sustained development strategy (Migdal
1988). This is unlikely in most African contexts
since organized interests are neither sufficiently
well organized or numerous to pose a serious threat
to state policy making capacity, but it does high-
light the need to create some degree of insulation for
key policy makers balanced by the creation of
formal channels for policy dialogue.
The fourth category of donor intervention concerns
the constitutive role performed by civil society
organizations, which takes a number of different
forms: increasing the legitimacy of the political
system by instilling and upholding democratic
values through civic education programmes; pro-
viding people with experience of participating in
democratic debate within these organizations; and
in recruiting and training new political leaders.
This is a less contentious area for donor interven-
tion, since these types of activities have been a
historic function of civic organizations in demo-
cratic societies. Many donors are supporting civic
education programmes, voter registration drives
and election monitoring. Such interventions have
helped to ensure that elections have been reason-
ably free and fair, but the longer term impact of
civic education programmes are more difficult to
assess. The problem might come with indiscrimi-
nate funding of organizations which do not have a
strong base of legitimacy or developed member-
ship, or which do not possess the technical skills
and technical expertise to enable them to carry out
such functions. Some groups might be formed in
response to the availability of donor funding and to
further individual political agendas which again
highlights the importance of careful appraisal and
the need for a thorough understanding of the com-
position of civil society in the countries in question.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Many of the problems identified in the previous
section are latent and there is as yet insufficient
documented evidence to provide a clear picture
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on the impact of donor interventions designed to
strengthen civil society organizations. Some of these
problems have been encountered by donors in di-
rectly funding development NGOs, especially those
concerning a possible erosion of independence and
autonomy, and there may be lessons which are of
relevance here (Riddell and Bebbington 1995).
There are, of course, positive reasons why support-
ing civil society organizations is a laudable objec-
tive for aid donors, if they are able to make a more
effective contribution to the process of democratic
consolidation as a result of external assistance. But
there are also a number of caveats. These fall into
two groups: following on from the previous section,
there are a series of operational concerns relating to
the funding relationship, but there are also a set of
more fundamental questions stemming from the
premises on which donor interventions in this area
are founded.
As was argued earlier, most donors adhere to a
definition of civil society steeped in the liberal
political tradition which holds that civic associa-
tions occupy a public domain located between the
family and the state, in which there is a shared
consensus on democratic norms and respect for
political pluralism. This approach tends to obscure
conflicts between different categories of civic asso-
ciations and fails to give adequate recognition to the
existence of divisive social forces which are averse
to democracy, but nevertheless form part of 'civil'
society. Hence interventions founded on the notion
that merely altering the balance between the state
and civil society in favour of the latter in some
quantitative sense will contribute to democratic
consolidation, overlook potentially destructive
elements in civil society which make such inter-
ventions both difficult and hazardous. One might
therefore conclude that most donors, as presently
constituted, are poorly-equipped to intervene
directly without either exacerbating such tenden-
cies or creating imbalances of power between
different organizations. But this ignores the fact
that most donors have already embarked on this
path, and that some have amassed considerable
experience. Given this scenario, there are a series of
operational issues that merit attention, which can
help to ensure that donors proceed cautiously with
modest expectations of what might be achieved in
view of the limitations and potential problems
sketched out earlier.
First, many of the organizations that donors would
like to support are small and fairly new. Large
quantities of aid resources in relation to their actual
requirements could swamp these organizations
before they are in a position to map out their
objectives, build up an independent membership
and gain wider legitimacy. At the same time aid in-
terventions directed towards civil society strength-
ening are unlikely to be very substantial, either in
terms of the size of projects funded or in terms of
their share of official development assistance, and
pressure on donors to allocate increased levels of
resources to meet overall good government policy
objectives may induce recipient organizations to
accept more funds than they actually require. Donor
coordination is clearly essential when the supply of
funding exceeds the requirements of recipient or-
ganizations in order to avoid a situation in which
there is competition for the more attractive counter-
parts or where unscrupulous organizations can gain
access to these funds.
Second, it takes time for these activities to bear fruit,
and the development of a mature and robust set of
civil society organizations that are able to perform
the various roles set out above can be an extremely
protracted process. External funding can assist in
this process and perhaps give it a boost, but it
would be folly to presume that civil societies can
be artificially induced when the material, organiza-
tional and ideological conditions prevailing in
many African countries undergoing political transi-
tion are not conducive to the rapid growth of civil
society. The availability of material resources is
certainly important, but it may not be central to
building up a robust civil society, since in situations
where associational life has long been suppressed,
building organizational capacity and developing a
distinctive ideological stance are essential pre-
requisites for enabling civil society organizations to
contribute effectively to the process of democratic
consolidation.
Third, it is difficult to assess the contribution made
by civil society organizations given the absence of
an established framework for evaluation. By their
very nature, many organizations may not have
developed internal procedures for documenting
their work or assessing their impact. Insistence by
donors on rigorous monitoring procedures could
divert energy away from the main goals of the
recipient organizations and undermine this effec-
tiveness. At the same time it will be necessary for
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donors to account for the use of these funds, and
evaluation can in turn induce greater accountability
from recipient organizations, but this should not
be at the expense of internal accountability to their
members.
This last caveat raises the question of the most
appropriate mechanism for channelling funds
and other resources to civil society organizations.
Donors employ a variety of mechanisms for this
purpose, ranging from using intermediaries such as
NGOs and political foundations, through to direct
funding from overseas mission funds. NGOs are
a tried and tested intermediary for working with
local membership organizations and advocacy
groups, but have less experience in civic and politi-
cal education, and in supporting specialized interest
groups such as trade unions and business associa-
tions. Political foundations often have this type
of expertise, but they have the disadvantage of
being perceived as partisan or as a potential threat
by state authorities. Donors usually channel trade
union funding through domestic trade union bod-
ies which have the links and the expertise but which
often lack an in-country presence. Using mission
funds to provide support in response to locally
generated requests is favoured by some donors but
has its limitations, especially if there is not good
donor coordination. These various mechanisms
will continue to be used by donors, but there are
other mechanisms and approaches which have not
been explored and which could help to obviate
some of the potential problems highlighted earlier.
For example, it may be more productive for donors
to specialize in certain categories of organization
with whom they have a certain familiarity or which
have a particular expertise. Linking up or twinning
domestic organizations with counterparts in devel-
oping countries, or between organizations from
the same region is a good route to follow since there
is much relevant experience that can be shared
and they have skills which donors do not possess.
Creating forums through which recipient organiza-
tions can exert some degree of influence over the
terms on which the support is provided can increase
the legitimacy of external funding and ensure that
it corresponds to locally defined needs.
On balance, while democracy promotion may be a
laudable objective in its own right, there are a num-
ber of potential pitfalls confronting donors who are
seeking to expand political aid programmes. Some
indication of the sorts of problems that might arise
has been given along with suggestions about action
that could be taken to mitigate these. Although
positive support for strengthening civil society
organizations has many advantages over political
conditionality as a means of advancing good gov-
ernment objectives, donors will need to be realistic
about the volume of assistance that can chan-
nelled through this mechanism since civil society
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